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scarcely less importance in the determination of causes, whether
civil or criminal, that the parties immediately affected. by them
should feel their justice, and propriety, and necessity even, than
that they should be absolutely so decided. We know very well
that a desire to render a judgment acceptable to the parties to be
affected by it, may be carried to such an extent as to become a
vice, or a weakness, and thereby most effectually defeat its object..
But within reasonable limits, and when pursued by dignified and
honorable means,-the effort and desire to render governmental
idministration acceptable to those who are to be affected by it, is
I. F. R.
certainly to be commended.
PF

s, July 20th 1867.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme .ourt of Indiana.
GOTHILF BLOCH v. ABEL ISHAM AND BENJAMIN M. SCHENCK.'
An agreement between adjoining owners of a town*lot, A. and B., that A.might build a party-wall equally upon the land of both, and that whenever B.

should build upon his lot so as to use the wall, he would pay one-half of the cost
thereof, is not a covenant running with the land so as.to entitle C., who had-purchasdd A.s lot, upon the performance of the condition as tq the use of the wall,
to sue B. for the money.

THE opinion of the court was delivered by
GaQO y,J.-The case made by the. complaint is this: Schenck
*and Isham, being 'the owners of adjoining lots in Yalparaiso,
entered into a written agreement whereby Schenck acquired the
right to build one of the walls of a brick store, then in process
of erection on his own lot, with one-half of itp thickness resting
on the lot of Isham; and Isharn a'cquirea for himself, his heirs
and assigns, the right to use the wall by joining a building
thereoi, and agreed for himself and them to pay one-half of- the
original cost of the wall when he or they should use it. *Schenck
completed the brick store on his lot, with one-half the width of
We are indebted for this opinion to the Hon. R. 0. Gregory.- -Ens. Am. LAw

BLOCH v. ISHAM.

one of its walls standing on Isham's lot. Afterward Schenck
conveyed his lot and store to Bloch and others, and Bloch subsequently became the sole owner of the lot and its appurtenances;
and while he was such owner Isham built a brick building on his
awn lot, and used the wall in question.
A demurrer was sustained to the complaint. The only question raised below, and here, is, whether Bloch or Schenck has
the right to the pay for the wall used by Isham.
The case turns upon the solution of .the question as to whether
Isham's agreement to pay for one-half of the party-wall is a
covenant running with the land.
There is some conflict in the authorities on this point. In
Burlock v. -Peck,'2 Duer (N. Y.) 90, the Superior Court of
New York held that such a covenant passed to the grantee of the
premises on which the building of the covenantor was" erected.
It is otherwise held in Pennsylvania: Ingles v. Bringhurs8t, 1
Dallas 841; Todd v. Stokes, 10 Barr 155; Gibeirt v. Drew, Id.
219; .gart et ux. v. Kucher, 5 S. & R. 1. It is claimed that
the cases in Pennsylvania turn on a statute. That statute simply
provides that "the first builder shall be reimbursed -for one
moiety of the charge of the party-wall, or for so much as the
next builder shall Use before he breaks into the wall." There is
nothing in this statute which is not embraced in the agreement
of tlhe parties in the case in judgment.
Brown v. Pentz, 1 N. Y. leg. Obs. 24, was never- officially
reported, and we do 'not recognise it as'authority. But we think
that the ruling of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in TieTd
v. Nichols, 17 Pick. 538, is conclusive on this question. It was
there held that the liability to pay for the party-waill was a mere
personal liability, and not repugnant to a covenant in a deed
that the land was free from incumbrances.
The easement which passed from Schenck to his grantees was,
the right to the support of the party-wall afforded by th~t part
thereof which rested upon the land of Isham.
Schenck and Isham were not tenants in common of the partywall, but each owned that part thereof on his side of the line;
Schenck advanced the money to build Isham's moiety, on the
agreement of the latter that he or his heirs would repay it when
he or they should have occasion to use the wall. This is clearly
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a mere personal covenant, in no wise connected with or affecting
the enjoyment of the lot conveyed to Bloch.
Judgment affirmed with costs.
In the Assize of Buildings, by Henry
Fitz Elwyne, first mayor of London, (1
Richard I., A. D. 1189), it is enacted
that "when it happens that two neighbors wish to build between themselves a
stone-wall, each of them ought to give
one foot and a -half of his land; and so
at their joint cost they shall build a
stone-wall between them, three feet in
thickness and sixteen feet in height.
And, if they wish, they shall make a
rain-gutter between them, at their joint
cost, to receive and carry off the water
from their houses, in such manner as
they may 'deem most expedient. But
if they should [not] wish to do so,
either of them may make a gutter by
himself, to carry off the water. that falls
frum his house -on to his own land, unless he can carry it into the king's highway.
"They may also, if they agree thereupon, raise the said wall as high as they
may please, at their joint cost. And if
it shall so happen that one wishes to
raise such wall and the other not, it shall
be fully lawful for him who io wishes it
to raise tfie par on his 'own foot and a
half as much is he may please, and to
build upon his part, without 'damage to
the other, at his own cost ; and he shall
receive the falling water in manner
already stated.
"And if any one shall build of stone,
.according to the assize, and his neighbor
through poverty cannot, or perchance
will not, then the latter Qught to give
unto him who so desires to build by the
assize, three feet of his own land ; and
the other shall make a wall upon thatland, at his own cost, three feet thick
and sixteen feet in height; and he who
gives the land shall have one clear half
of such wall, ind may place his timber
upon it and build.

"But this assize is not to be granted
unto any one so as to cause any doorway, inlet, or outlet, or shop, to be narro~ved or restricted, to the annoyance of
a neighbor.
"This assize is also granted unto him
who demands it as to the land of his
neighbor, even though such land shall
have been built upon, provided the wall
so built is noi of stone.
"Also, no one of those who have a
common stone-wall built between them,
may, or ought to, pull down any portion
of his part of such wall, or lessen its
thickness, or make arches in it, without
the assent and will of the other.
"If any person shall wish to build
the whole of a wall upon his own land,
and his neighbor shall demand against
him an assize, it shall be at his election
either to join the other in building a wall
in common between them, or to build a
wall upon his own land and-to have the
same as freely and" meritoriously a in
manner already stated :" Liber Albus
of the City of London, Book MI., Pt. 2,
p. 278 et seq., edited by Henry T. Riley,
under the direction of the Master of the
Rolls, London, 1859.

This assize or ordinance, from which
we hare quoted at some length, as the
volume is believed to be not generally
found in the libraries of this country,
exhibits a remarkable degree of efficiency
for that early and turbulent day in the
police regulations of thai great city
which, as Lord CAirPBtLL says, was "1a
sort of free republic in a despotic kingdom:" Lives of the Lord Chancellors,
1, 8. The recent destructive fire in the
reign of King Stephen, alluded to- in
Liber Albus, had led to a great improvement in building by the 'substitution of
stone-walls and tiled roofs for the wood,
thatch, and straw previously used, and
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in u, cm.-se of this change much dispute had probably arisen as to partywalls and the rights of support and roofdrainage depending thereon. Hence,
this assize was ordained, as the preamble
states, "per discretioresviros civitatis, ad
contentiones pacificandas." It is probable, however, that it only consolidated
and enacted into positive* law, the prerious custom of the city. To this cusPin, the independent growth- of the conlenience and' necessities of a large and
ompact city, we prefer to ]oik for the
foundation of the preseint law of partywials, rather than to the urban servitude of the civil law, tigni -immittendi,
1hough similar circumstagces produced
similar laws in both cases, and in later
Jimes, no doubt, the just reasoning and
inature wisdom of the civil law had great
influence in developing the English law
of party-walls as well as of other easements.
The custom of party-walls, developed
by time and regulated by virious statutes, was introduced into this country,
together with the process of foreign attachment, the custom offene sole teaders,
and other customs of London, by tue
first settlers in Philadelphia under 'William Penn, and in 1721 the legislature
of Pennsylvania passed an act, still in
force, regulating in detail the whole
subject of party-walls in the city of
Philadelphia. Under this act it has been
held that the builder's right to compensation for one-half the party-wall is not
a lien on the adjoining land, but a mere
personal charge against the builder of
the second house, and does not run with
the land against his assignee: Ingles v.
Bringhurst, I Dallas 341 ; Hart v.
Kaicher, 5 S. & R. 1. Therefore if the
first builder be paid before the second
house is built the right to compensation
is gone; it is neither a hereditament nor
an appurtenance to land and does not
pass by a conveyance of the house:
Hart v.K uctr, 5 S. & R. I; Davids v.

Harris, 9 Barr 501; Todd v -Stokes, 10
Id. 155 ; Gilbert v. Drew, Id. 219.
By statute, however, the riglt to compensation for use of a party-wall is now
made -an interest in the realty and passes
by a conveyance of the house unless excepted in the deed : Act of 10th April
1849, Pamph. L. 600 ; Knig t v. Beenken, 6 Casey 372.
Only a few of the general principles
governing party-walls independently of
stattitory enactments have been discussed
in this country.
1. Without a contract or statutory
authority no owner has a right to build
his wall beyond his own line, and if he
does so the adjoining owner may treat it
as a trespass and compel it to be taken
down, or he may use it as a party-wall
without paying anything for it: Sherrerd v.. Cisco, 4 Sandford 480; Orman
v. Day, 5 Fla. 385. The observations
of WOOD*ARD, J., in Zugenbuhler v.
Gilliam, 3 Clarke 391, that at common
law the adjoining owner by using the
wall makes it a.party-wall and becomes
liable for the value of half the wall,
are not supported by authority, as the
passage cited from 2 Bouvier's Inst. 178
is based on the statute of Pennsyl'rani. 'This case, therefore, except so
far as fouiidd. on the statute of Iowa,
canet be regarded as sound law.
2. Primd facie the wall and the land
on which it itands are held in England
to belong %o,the adjoining owners in
moieties as tenhnts in common, but this
presumption is rebutted when the amount
of each one's ownjership can h. ascertained, and each is then owner in severalty of his portion: Gale on Easements
411 (3d London ed.) And the' American courts are said to lean towards this
latter presumption : Sherrerd v. Cisco, 4
Sandford S. C. 480. Each half, how'ever, is subject to an easement of support for the other.
3. If two adjoining owners build a
wall partly on each lot, and by express
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agreement or by continuous use for twenty
years, treat it as a party-wall, it becomes
a technical party-wall and each has an
easement of support for his half: Webster v. Stevens, 5 Duer 553.
4. So, if an owner of adjoining lots
build, upon them a wall partly on each,
intended and necessary for the support
of both, a conveyance of either house
and lot with its appurtenances, grants an
easement for the support of the house in
so much of the wall as stands upon the
other lot: Eno v. Del Vecchio, 4 Duer
53; 6Id. 17.
5. After such a grant and continued
'use of the wall for twenty years neither
can remove the wall' or deal with his
half so as to impair the support of the
other's house: Eno. v. Del Vecchio, 4
Duer 53; 6 Id. 17; Potter v. White, 6
Bosworth 644; Phillips v. Bordman, 4
Allen 147. In Potterv.White, one who
took down a party-wall and built a new
one without the-consent of the adjoining
owner, was held liable for loss of rent,
and expenses of repair, &c., made necessary by the removal of the old wall
and building of the new. In Phillips v.
Bordman, the Supreme Court of Massahusetts granted an injunction to restrain
one owner of an ancient party-wall from
cutting away a portion of is face and
erecting a new wall on his own land two
inches from that part of the old wall left
standing, and connected with it and
supporting it by occasiouial projecting
bricks and ties.
And in Eno v. Del Vrecchio, ubi sup."
it was said that if either wishes to change
the wall he may do so within the limits
of his own lot, provided he does not
injure the other, and for sucht purpose he
may shore'up the whole wall for. a reasonable time while the changes are in
progress, but if he does this without the
consent-of the adjoining owner, he does
it at his own peril, as the question of
negligence does not come in at all, and
no degree of care or skill will relieve

him from liability if injury is actually
done.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, however,
have held the contrary, and that where
owners of adjoining lots build a partywall bt express agreement for the support of their houses, but without any
stipulation as to the continuance of the
wall, either party or his grantee has. a
right to take down his part of the wall,
after notice-and using sufficient carealthough it may have been used as a
party-wall for twenty-one years ; and
where the wall fell down, notwithstanding the care, it was held that there was
no cause of action : .ieatt v. Morris,.
10 Ohio State 523.
The rules above enunciated in Eno v.
Dd Vecchio and other cases douothhowever, apply to a party-wall built Dy
tenants for years of adjoining Iots, so as
to affect the reversioners or their grantees: Webster T. Stevens, 5 Duer 553.
And the right to use the party-wall is
only the right to use it as it has been
used. - Thus, A. conveyed a house to B.
with a reservation, "the owners on both
sides to have mutual use of the present
partition-wall." The wall was entirely
on the lot conveyed to B., and only a
portion of it was used as a partition-wall.
A. subsequently'conveyed .the adjoining
lot to C., who enlarged th6 house aind
used a greater part of the wall than was
so used at the time of the conveyance tb
B. Held that he was liable to B. for
damages in so doing: Price v. M~cConrid, 27 Ill. 255.
6. How long the easement of support
acquired by lapse of time or by contract
not specifying, the term fdr which it is
granted, continues,'is still an unsettled
question. That it continues so long kb
the wall remains safe and well adapted
to the original purpose, appears to be
conceded by all the cases except Hieatt v.
Morris, 10 Dhio State 523, already cited
(supra 5). When, however, .the wall
becomes ruinous and unsa. e or unfit fot
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its purpose of support, either party has a the builder against the person using the
ngnt to take down his half in a skilful wall, and did not run with the land
manner, after due notice to the other either in favor of the assignee of the
party. And if one-half cannot be taken first builder or against the assignee of
down without danger, the owner may the second builder. To the same effect
take down the whole, and such right is is the principal case. In New York,
not affected by the nature of the use or however, the decisions are otherwise.
occupation of the other building: Camp- Thus; in Burlock v. Peck, 2 Duer 90,
bell v. Mesier, 4 Johns. Ch. 334; Part. A., owning two 'adjoining lots, conridge v. Gilbert, 3 Duer 184; s. c., 15 veyed one of them with the privilege to
the grantee of building a party-wall on
N. Y. 601.
But whether the right of support con- the division-line one-half on .ach lot,
tinues longer than the existence and fit- and covenanted to pay for one-half the
ness of the old wall is questionable. In wall when used. A.'s grantee built the."
Campbell v. Mesier, 4 Johns. Ch. 334, wall, and then conveyed to B. A. then
Chancellor KENT appeared to think that conveyed the adjoinifig lot, and his
the easement was in tee, and where one grantee used the wail. Held; that B. owner pulled down an ancient party- could recover of A. or his executors the
wall which had becomQ ruinous, and re- value of one-half the wall. And, also,
built it, the Chancellor held the adjoining that B. having died after the use of the
owner liable to contribute rateably to the wall by'the grantee of the adjoining lot,
expense, provided that if the new wall the action was properly brought by B.'s
should be higher or of more expensive administrator, not his heir.
material than the old one, the builder
In this ase the question of the liashould pay the extra expense. But in bility of the grantee of the second lot,
Sherrerdv. Cisco, 4 Sandford 480, it was who actually used the wall; .was not
held that if the wall be destroyed by fire raised, but in Keeltas v. Penfold, 4 E.
or accident the adjoining owners are not D. Smith 122, a covenant by A. for
bound to contriBate to rebuild it. The "himself, his heirs and assigns,?' to pay
land lecomes freed from all servitude in for half a party-wall when used, was"
kelation to the party-wall, as in case of held to run with the land s'as to charge
two adjoining lots without buildings. A.'s devisee. And in Weyman's Ex'r.
And in Partridge v. Gilbert, 3 Duer v. Ringold, -1 Bradford 52, a covenant
184, 15 N. Y. 601, DENIO, C. J., was to pay one-half the value of a p.iyof opinion that the right to support ceased wall when lised, to the-builder, "his
when the wall became unfit, whether executors or assigns,"was held to run
from age or. accident, and that each with the land in favor of the grantee of
owner was then remitted to his original the covenantee. In the last case it was
unincumbered title to the division-line, expressly agreed that the covenant
citing Sherrerdv. Cisco, and dissenting should bind the lands- and.thf" succesfrom the views in Campbell v. Mesier. sive owners thereof," but the surrogate
In the same case, however, SHANKLAN3D, was of opinion that the coveiiant ran
J., seemed of the contrary opinion, and with the land independently of this agreeapproved Campbell v. Afesier.
ment.
7. In regard to the right to compensa- * See, also, Giles v. Dugro, I Duer
tion for the use of a party-wall, the cases 331, where A. covenanted with B., his
differ. In Pennsylvania, in th cases vendee, that the premises sold were clear
cited above, it was held, until the Act of all former or other grants, bargains,
of 1849, that it was a personal right of and incumbrances whatsoever," but, in
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fact, A. had previously conveyed to C.
the right to use a wall as a party-wall,
and it was held that this was an incumbrance, and the use of the wall a partial
eviction of B., who was entitled to re-

cover from A. a sum having the same
ratio to the purchase-money as the value
of the land so occupied by C. bore to the
value of the whole.
3. T. M.

Supreme Court of Penn8 flvania.
THE PITTSBURGH, FORT WAYNE AND CHICAGO RAILWAY COMPANY. v. HINDS AND WIFE.
Whqre a passenger on a railway train is injured by the misconduct of a fellowpassenger, the company is liable only in case there was negligence in its officers
in not making proper efforts to prevent the injury.,
Railroad companies are bound to furnish men enough for the ordinary demsinds
of transportation, but not a police force adequate to extraordinary emergencies,as to quell mobs by the wayside.
It is negligence in a conductor to voluntarily admit improper persons or undue
mimbersinto the cars.
'Where the evidence shows that an excited crowd, at a way station, among whom
were drunken and disorderly bersons, rushed upon the cars in-such numbers as to
defy the resisting power at the disposal of the conductor, it is eiror in the court to
stibmit that to the jury from which they may find negligence in the conductor it
admitting in the cars -either iniproper persons or undue numbers.
In case of fighting or disorder in *the cars the conductor must at once do all he
can to quell it. If necessary, he should stop the train, call to.his aid the engineer,
firemen, all the brakesmen and willing passengers, lead the way himself and expel
the offenders, or demonstrate by an earnest experiment, that the undertaking is
impossible.

ERROR to Common Pleas of Allegheny county.
The facts and material points raised in the case are fully stated
in the opinion.
-

Hampton, for plaintiff in error.
l.ar8hall, contrA.
The opinion of the. court was delivered by
WOODWARD, C. J.-The action is for an injury sustaiued- by
the plaintiff's wife whilst she was a passenger in the cars of de-

fendant; and what is peculiar in the. case is the fact that the
injury was not occasioned by defective'machinery, or cars, or

road, or by anything that pertained properly to their business as
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transporters, but was caused by the fighting of passengers among
themselves. Drunken and quarrelsome men intruded into the
ladies' car in great numbers whilst the train stopped at .Beaver
station ; and in the disgraceful fight which ensued among them
the plaintiff's arm was broken, and for this the railroad company
is sued. Had the suit been against the riotous men who did the
mischief, the right of recovery would have been undoubted, for
it is not more the duty of railroad companies to transport their
passengers safely than it is the duty of passengers to behave in
a quiet and orderly manner. This is a auty which passengers
owe both to the company and to fellow-passengers, and when one
is.injured. by neglect of this duty the wrongdoer should respond
in damages. But in such a case, is the company liable ?
There is no -such privity between the company and the disorderly passenger as to make them liable on the principle of
respondeat superior. The only ground on which they can be
charged is a violation of the contract they made with the injured
party. They undertook to carry the plaintiff safely, and so
negligently performed this contract that she was injured. This
is the ground of her action ; it can rest upon no other. The
negligence of the company or of their officers in charge of the
train is the gist of the action, and so it is laid in the declaration.
And this question of negligence was submitted to the jury in a
manner of wbich the company have no reason to complain. The
only- question for us as a court of error, therefore, is whetherthe case was,, pon the*whole, one that. ought to have been submitted. The manner of the submission having been "unexceptionable, was there error in the fact of submission ?
The learned judge reduced the case to three propositions. He
said the plaintiff claims to recover,
1st. Because the evidence shows that the conductor did not do
his duty.at Beaver station, by allowing improper persons to get
on the cars.2d. Because he allowed more persons than was proper under
the circumstances to get on the train, and to remain upon it.
8d. That he did not do what he could and ought to have done
to put a stop to the fighting upon the train which resulted in the
plaintiff's injury.
As to the first of the above propositions, the judge referred
the evidence to the jury especially with a view to the question
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whether the disorderly character of the men at Beaver station
had fallen under the conductor's observation so as to induce a
reasonable man to apprehend danger to the safety of the passengers.
The evidence on this point was conflicting, but it must be
assumed that the verdict has established the conclusion that -he
conductor knew that drunken men were getting into the cars.
Let it be granted also as a conclusion oflaw that a conductor is
culpably negligent who admits drunken and quarrelsome men into
a passenger car. What then ?
The case shows phat an agricultural fair was in progress in the
vicinity of Beaver station; that an excited crowd assembled at
the station rushed upon the cars in such numbers as to defy the'
resisting power at the disposal of the conductor, and that the man
who commenced the fight sprung upon the platform of the hindmost car after they were in motion.
Of what consequence, then, was the fact that the condultor
knew these were improper passengers ? It is not the case of a
voluntary reception of such passengers. If it were there would
be great force in the point,. .for more improper'. conduct could
scarcely be imagined in the conductor of a train than voluntarily
to receive and introduce among quiet-passengers, and particularly
ladies, a mob of drunken rowdies. But the case is that of a mob
rushing with such violence and in such numbers, upon the cars,
as to overwhelm the conductor as well as the passengers.
It is no.t the duty oF ra.ir ,ad companies to furnish their trains
with a police force adequate to such emergencies.- They are
bound to furnish men enough for the ordinary demands of transportation, but they are not bound to anticipate or provide for such
an unusual occurrence as that under consideration.
When passengers purchase, their tickets and- take their seats
they know that the train is furnished with the proper hafids for
the.conduct of the train, but not with a police force sufficient to
quell mobs by. the wayside. No such element enteis into the
implied contract. It is one of the incidental risks which all who
trav el must take upon themselves, and it is not reasonable that! a
passenger should throw it upon the transporter.
These observations are equally applicable to the second preposition. The conductor did not " allow", improper numbers, any
more than. improper characters, to get upon the cars. He saya
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he took no fare from them, and in no manner recognised them as
passengers. To allow undue numbers to enter a car is a great
wrong, almost as great as knowingly to introduce persons of improper character, and, in a suitable case, we would not hesitate
to chastise the practice severely. But this is not a case in which
the conductor had any volition whatever in respect either to num.
bers or characters. He was simply overmastered; and the only
ground upon which the plaintiff could charge negligence upon
the company would be in -not furnishing the conductor with a
counter force sufficient to repel the intruders. This- was not the
ground assumed by the Plaintiff, and it would scarcely have been.
maintainable had it been assumed.
Taking the case as it is presented in the evidence, we think it
was error for the court to submit the cause to the jury on these
two grounds. -But upon7 the third ground we think the cause was
properly submitted.
If the conductor did not do all he could to stop the fighting,
there was negligence. Whilst a conductor is not provided with
a force" sufficient to resist such a raid as was iade upon the train
in this instance, he-has, nevertheless, large powers at his disposal,
and, if properly used, they are generally sufficient to preserve
order within the cars, and to expel disturbers -of the peace. His
official character and, position are a power. Then he may stop
the train and call 'to his assistance the engineer, the firemen, all.
the brakesmen, and such passengers as are willing to lend a helping hand., and it must be a very formidable mob indeed, more formidable than we have reason to believe had obtruded into these
cars, that can resist such a force. Until at least he has put forth
the forces at his disposal, 'no conductor has a right to abandon
the scene of conflict. To keep his train in motion and busy hinself with collecting fares in forward cars whilst a general fight
was raging in the rearmost car where the lady passengers had'
been placed, was to fall far short of his duty. Nor did his exhortation to the passengers to throw the fighters out come up to
the demands of the hour.. He should have led the way, and no
doubt passengers and hands would have followed his lead. He
should have stopped the train and hewed a passage through the
intrusive mass until he had expelled the rioters, or have demonstrated, by an earnest experiment, that the undertaking was ira
possible.
VOL. XVI.-2

TELEGRAPH CO. v. CAREW.

Such are the impressions which this novel case has made upon
our minds. We think there was error in submitting the case
upon the first two propositions, but none in submitting it on
the third; and if the record showed that the jury decided it
upon this latter ground, the judgment could be affirmed. But
inasmuch as the error we find upon the record may have infected
the verdict, the judgment must be reversed, and a ven ir de novo
awarded.

uTpreme Court of Michigan.
THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO- v. JOHN H. CAREW.
Telegraph companies, in the absence of any provision of the statute, are not
common carriers, and their obligations and liabilities are not to be measured by
the same rules, but must be fixed by considerations growing out of the miature of
the business in which they are engaged. They do not become insurers against
errors in the transmission of messages, except so far as by their rules and regulations, or by contract, they choose to assume that position.
When a person writes a message under a printed notice, requesting the company
to send such mnessage according to the conditions of such notice, held that the
printed blank was a general proposition to all persons of the terms and conditions
ipon which messages would be sent, and that by writing said message and delivering it to the cpmpany, the party must be held as accepting the proposition, and
that such act becomes a contract upon those terms and conditions.
. Where a telegraph company established regulations to the effect that it would not
be responsible for errors or delay in the transmission of unrepeated messages,-and
further, that it would assume no liability for any error or neglect committed by
any other company over whose lines a message might be sent in the course of its
Iestination, held, that such regulations were reasonable and bindinglon those dealing with the company.

ERROR-to Wayne .Circuit.

This was an action of assumpsit'brought by defendant in error,
to recover damages for the failure on the part of'plaintiff in error
to transmit correctly a certain telegraph message from Detroit to
Baltimore. The charges were paid to Baltimore, though plaintiff
in error's lines only extended to Philadelphia. .The message was
correctly sent to Philadelphia, and delivered there to the agent
of the Baltimore line. The error occurred between that point
and Baltimore.
On the face of the paper upon which the message was writien,
was printed the following immediately above the .written mes.
sage:-
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"WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.-COMAM1ERCIAL MESSAGE.
SEE CONDITIONS ON BACK.

Write plainly. Give full address. Use no abbreviations or figures. 'Send the
following message, without repeating, subject to above conditions and agreement
indorsed on back."

On the back of the same paper, in full and clear type, was
printed the following.:"'WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
CONDITIONS.'

In order to guard against- and correct as much as possible some of the errors
arising from atmospheric and other causes appertaining to telegraphy, every
important message should be repeated by being sent back from the station at which
it is received to the station from which it is originally sent. Half the usual price
will be charged for 'repeating the message. And while this company'in good
faith will endeavor to send messages correctly and promptly, it will not be responsible for errors or delays in the transmission or delivery, nor for the non-delivery
of repeated messages beyond two hundred times the sum paid for sending the
message, unless a special agreement for insurance be made in writing, and the
amount of risk specified on this agreement, and paid at the tirde of sending the
message; Nor will the company be responsible for any error or delay in the
transmission or delivery or for the non-delivery of any unrepeated message
beyond the amount paid for sending the same, unless in like manner specially
insured, and amount of risk stated-thereon and paid for at the time. No liability
is assumed far error in cipher or obscure messages. Nor is any liability assumed
by this company for any error or neglect of any other company over whose-lines
this message may. be sent to reach its destination. And this company is hereby
made lthe agent of the sender of this message to forward it over the lines extending'
beyond those of this company.
"No agent or employee is allowed to vary these terms, or to make any other
or verbal agreement, nor any promise as to the time of Verformance; and no one
but a superintendent is authorized to make a special agreement. These terms
apply through the whole course of this message, on all lines by which it may be
transmitted."

The plaintiff below testified-and there was no evidence to the
contrary-that he never read the above conditions, nor had his
attention called to them ; that he was not informed, nor did he
know that the message passed over the line of any other company
on its way to Baltimore, or that it was necessary to repeat the
message in order to hold the company responsible for mistakes.
The line of this company extended only to
Philadelphia. The
message was correctly transmitted to that point, and there col
rectly delivered to the agent of the line from Philadelphia to
Baltimore. But when received at Baltimore the message read

TELEGRAPH CO. v. CAREW.

"four cases," instead of" forty," and the four cases only were
sent by Rowe & Co. This action is brought to recover the dam
ages resulting from this error.
The court charged the jury
1. That the plaintiff was not bound by the conditions on the
back of the despatch, unless his attention was called to them.
2. That it is immaterial on which line the error occurred; the
defendant having received the pay for the proper transmission of
the despatch from Detroit to Baltimore.
. 3. That if the plaintiff's attention was not called to the reces.
sity of repeating the message in order to secure its correct
delivery, he was not bound so to do to entitle him to recover.
To each of these charges exception was taken; and, the court
was requested, but refused, to charge directly the contrary ; and
that there was a .fatal variance between the contract declared
upon And that proved (the declaration being upon an absolute
undertaking to send to and deliver the message at Baltimore).
-Judgment for plaintiff below.
Walker d. Kent, for plaintik.in error.-1. Telegraph compa.
nies are in no proper sense common carriers, or indeed bailees of
any sort.

* Bailment in all its forms is a contract on the part of the bailee
to take some particular thing or person, and deliver again the
same thing or person.
The telegrapher receives a certain- message, written-or spoken,
and undertakes, not t o convey the' identical message or -ords, l t
to reproduce the, same words at another place, and to another
person. He may neglect or refuse to perform his promise, but
the thing received cannot be stolen, cannot be lost.
The ground on which, by the policy of the law, the common
carrier is made an insurer, is that the goods intrusted to him are
absolutely in his power ; that without danger of detection he
might claim that they had been lost o stolen: 1 Pars. on
Cont. 684.
The reason of the rule failing as to telegraphers, it is unjust to.
apply to them a rule confessedly harsh in its' application to
carriers.
He should not be held responsible for mistakes without negli
gence, and 'from causes beyond his control.

TELEGRAPH CO. v. CAREW.

21

A declaration against him should always aver that he promised
to use reasonable diligence and skill ; and the breach should be
an allegation of neglect.
2. The contract is a special one ; the printed conditions form a
part of it.
The conditions were general regulations made by the company.
They are reasonable regulations, and Carew was bound to take
notice of them. If he wanted to send a message, he should have
inquired on what terms the company sent messages.
By writing his message upon the" company's tlank, Carew
assented to the conditiois- written thereon ; and is now estopped
from denying his knowledge of them. Even though telegraph
companies were to be held to the strict rules of a common "carrier,
still they could 'make special contracts limiting their general
liability.
This doctrine issettled in this state: -6 Mich. 248; 25 New
York 442; 5 H. & N. 867"; 45 Barb. 274 ; 83 E. L, & Eq.180.;
18 Md. 841 ; 1 Mete. (Ky.) 164.
0. ifunt, for defendant in error.-It is not claimed that
defendant in error ever read the conditions on the printed blanks
of the company, or that his attention was ever called to them.
1. The principle is elemefiiary that no party can be bound by
an instrumeni; the contents and conditions of which are concealed,.
or even if the same were not disclosed by the party.1enefited
thereby.
Telegraph companies, like common carriers, may limit their
liability by a special acceptance when the message is delivered'to
them, but it must be brought home to tthe knowledge .of those
employing them: 3 Mich. 89; 6 Id. 257.
2. The same rule must apply to telegraph. companies that
applies to common carriers, who receive the whole compensation
for the carriage of a package addressed to a place beym.d the
timits of their own route. That is, that -he engages - for the due
delivery of the package at the place of destination, unless he
.xpressly limits his responsibility to his own route ; or the circumstances are such as to clearly indicate that that was the
understanding of the contracting parties: 19 Wend. 584; 25 Id.
660 ; 8 M. & W. 421 ; 8 Sandf. S. C. 610 ; 24 Barb. 882, 48 Id.
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225; 8 Pick. 23; 5 B. & P. 182; 4 Dalt. 206; 5 Am. Law
Register 414.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CORISTIANCY, J. (after stating the facts).-If the printed
request on the face of the paper, to "send the message without
repeating subject to above conditions and agreement on back,"
together with the terms and conditions referred to, constituted or
governed the contract for transmission, then the qntire charge of
the court w~s wrong, and the plaintiff below had no right to
recover.
The competency of the parties to enter into such a contract is
not denied-but it is insisted that telegraph companies are common carriers; that carriers cannot limit their common-law liability by a mere notice, because the other party has the right to
insist upon having his goods carried by them, subject to their
common-law liability, notwithstanding the notice ; that the parties
employing them are not bound to pay any attention to such
notice; and to exempt the carrier from such liability it must be
shown, not -only that the notice was 'brought home to the 'party
dealing with him, but that he actually assented to the terms.
We do not deem it necessary to'discuss the case upon .this
theory. Our opinion upon its application to carriers will be
expressed in the several cases of the Michigau Southern, and
Northern Indiana Railroad Co., now before us.. We are all
agreed that telegraph companies, in the absence of any provision
of statute imposing such liabilities, are not common carriers, and
that their *obligations and liabilities are not to be measured by
the same. rules ; -that they do not become insurers, against all
errors in the transmission or delivery of messages, except so far
as by their rules and regulations, or by contract or otherwise,
they choose to assume that position, or hold themselves out as
such to the public, or to those who employ them. The statute of
this state authorizing such companies, and, to some ektent, prescribing their duties -and liabilities, imposes no such liability,:
Comp. L. Oh. 70.
Impartiality and good faith are the chief, if not thd only, obligations required by the statute, so far as relates to the question
here involved. Beyond these statute requirements, their obliga.
tions must be fixed by considerations growing out of the nature
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of the business in which they are engaged, the character qf the
particular transactions which may arise in the course of their
business, and the application of the principles of justice and
public policy recognised alike by common sense and the common
law. The statutes of the other states in reference to this branch
of business are in the main substantially like our own.
Telegraph- companies, like common carriers, it is true, exercise
a public employment; and the former are bound to send messages
for those who apply and are ready to pay the usual or settled
charges, as the latter are bound to transport goods for those who
seek their services upon similar terms; and doubtless the same
rules for securing impartiality would apply to both, except as
modified by statute: see section 15 of chapter 70, above cited.
But beyond this; as relates to the actual transportation of goods
in the one case, and the transmission of ideas in the other, there
is, in the nature of 'things and the different means and agencies
'emloyed, but very little substantial resemblance; and any analogy must be more fanciful than real, and likely to lead to error
and injustice. This is not a case which calls upon us for laying
down the rules, which must be held to govern as to the degree of
skill, care, and .diligence to be required in the transmission of
messages.. But, doubtless, the use of good apparatus and instruments would be required, and reasonable skill, and a high-perhaps. the, ve:y highest-degree of care and diligence in their
operation. And when .an error has qccurred in the transmission
of a message, it may be found that they ought to be held primd
face guilty of negligence, the onus of pioof- resting upon them
to show diligence, the means for doing this being peculiarly
within their knowledge and power.
But it would be extremely unjust, and, considering the small
amount-of compensation for sending a message, would effectually
put an end to this method of correspondence, to hold them absolutely liable as insurers for the entire correctness of all m~ssages
transmitted, or to hold them responsible for all damages which
might accrue from an error, especially when only a singlb transmission, without repeating, is relied upon or paid for; or, to deny
them alI-power by rules, regulations, or notices to limit their
liability even in the case of repeated messages. And it would
be equally unreasonable to require them to repeabt a message vhen
they are paid only for a single transmission.
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And while, in settled weather, or when the normal condition or
operation of the electrical currents is not affected by any temporary or local disturbance, a single transmission by a skilful operator
may be relied upon, as a general rule, and for matters of comparatively small importance, yet it must be well known to most men
(if not to all who have such a decree of intblligence as to be
likely to resort to this mode of correspondence) that the-electrical
state of the atmosphere is liable to sudden and violent changes,
w.tending over areas of greater or less extent, which cannot be
foreseen or guarded against, and which materially affect the currents transmitted from a battery along the wires, and for a time
render the opeiation of the instruments uncertain and unreliable ;
that these disturbances often affect distant portions of the line or
of a connecting line, while their influence may be scarcely felt
or not felt at all at the station from which a message is sent, and
that therefore to insure'entire and uniform correctness, the only
safe method is to have the message verified by repeating it hack
to the station from which it was sent.
The regulation therefore of most, if not all telegraph companies
operating extensive lines, allowing messages to be sent by.single
transmission for a lower rate of charge, and requiring a larger
compensation when repeated, must be considered as highly reasonable, giving to their customers the option of either mode, according to the importance of the message, or any other circumstance
which may affect the question.
And as the compensation ought' always to be in proportion tc
the risk assumed, the provision in these regulations in reference
to insurance, must be regarded also as just and reasonable.
As the. statute -of this state (and of the other states, so far d.e
we have examined them) requires them to receive despatches
from and for other telegraph lines, and to transmit, &c., it is but
reasonable, when the so message is to pass over the lines of
more than one company, that each should be responsible only for
the errors occurring on its own line; and the receipt of the
money by the company first transmitting the message, as the
agent of the other lines; is much more for the convenience of
the person sending the message, than for that of the cbmpany.
Such being the reasonable and settled rules, regulations, and
usage of this company, it was, we think,-for the -plaintiff, before
sending his message, to acquaint himself with those rules,' regu-
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lations, and usages, and the terms up6n which messages would be
sent. And in the absence of any special inquiry by him upon
the subject, the natural inference would seem to be, either that
he already knew and assented to such rules, regulations, or usages,
or that he intended to assent to them whatever they might be.
But to give to all who should wish to send messages full information upon these matters, in an authentic and reliable form,
which could not so well be done verbally by special explanations
to each applicant, this company has very properly printed their
rules and regulations upon the very paper upon which each message is to be written ; and upon the very face of the paper immediitely preceding the blank space on which the message is written,
is. the printed request to send the message "subje ct -to above conditions and agreement indorsed on back."
The signature of the
message becbmes also an adoption of, and signature to, this request.
The party sending the message fills up and signs the printed
blanks ; and, in form, at least, it is. as much his contract as if he
had written the whole printed conditions or a contract in which
they were inserted with his own hand.
This printed matter on the face of the paper could hardly escape
the attention of any one not naturally or purposely blind, who
should write a message upon the paper. He- must at least know
that there is some printed matter on the face of the paper,-and
he must be held to know that it has been placed there for some.
purpose connected with the message. It is therefore no excuse
for him to say he did not read this printed matter before his eyes.
It was gross carelessness on his part if he did not.
The printed blank, before the message was written upon it, was
a general proposition to all persons of the terms and conditions
upon which messages would be sent. By writing the message
under it,signing and delivering it for transmission, the plaintiff
below accepted the proposition, and it became a contract upon
those terms and conditions: Breese v. United States Telegrap~h
Co., 45 Barb. 274, a parallel case, in all material respectS, with
the reasoning of which we are fully satisfied. See also Lewis v.
reat Western Railway Co., 5 H. & N. 867; Bryant v. Telegraph Co., 1 Daley 578; McAndrews v. Telegraph Co., 38 Eng.
L. & Eq. 180.
The conditions on the back of the mes-age, it is true, did not
state where the line of this company terminated, nor what other
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line the message must pass over. But the reference to the terms
of sending over other lines, was sufficieit, if the plaintiff deemed
it of any importance to him, to put him upon inquiry, when the
fact would at once have been ascertained.
The contract, which the evidence tended to show, was for a
single transmission by the company over its own line without
repetition, and for delivering the message as the agent of the
plaintiff to the next line in its course to Baltimore ; a contract
which the evidence tended to show had been fully complied with.
The contract, therefore, was essentially different from that declared
upon. The charge was erroneous upon all the points stated in
the record.
The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial
awarded.
CAMPBELL and CooLEY, JJ., concurred.

District Court of the United State . Southern Districtof NV
York. In Bankruptcy.
MATTER OF CHARLES G. PATTERSON.'
Where a creditor made a motion for an order to examine a bankrupt before the
first meeting of creditors, and the bankrupt objected that no such order could be
made at such time, this raised an issue of law which the register should have. certitied to the court.
But if the bankrupt argues and submits the question to the judgment of the
register, he waives his right to a certificate, and 'if, after a decision against him,
too late.
he submits his points and requests an adjournment to the court,'he is.
After a decision by the register there is no issue to certify.
A creditor has a right to prove his claim at any time after the commencement
of proceedings, and having done so has a right to an order for the examination of
the bankrupt under section 26, without waifing for the meeting of creditors.
If depositions in proof of claims are filed before the day appointed for the
meeting of creditors, the register is not bound to notify the bankrupt.
Notwithstanding the filing of such 'a deposition and entering the claim on the
list, the register may still, under section 23, at the first meeting of creditors postpone the proof of the claim and exclude the creditor 'from voting in the choice of
an assignee.
The court has, under section 22, full- control at all times, of all debts, anin all
proofs of debts, even after the depositions in proof have been ftled; and the bankrupt can, at the first meeting of creditors, object, under section 23, to the validity
of, and the right to prove any debts, without regard to the time the depositions in
proof were filed.
I We are indebted for this case to " The Gazette."
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IN this case an adjudication of bankruptcy was made Septem.
ber 12th 1867, and a warrant was issued to the marshal returnable
October 23d.
On the 23d of September, Tupper & Beattie, creditors on the
debtors' schedules, filed a proof of debt. On the 25th of September, Tapper & Beattie made a motion before the register for
an order for the examination of the bankrupt, under section 26
of the act, and according to No. 45. The bankrupt objected to
the granting of the order, on the ground that the order could not
be made before the first meeting of cr ditors.
After argument the legister granted the motion. Thereupon
the bankrupt moved that the question be adjourned into court,
for the decision of the judge under the provisions of section 4
of the act, and tendered his questions, and issues to the creditor
in order that the crelitor should state his points, and that, issue
of law being thus joined, the same might bo adjourned into court
by the register for decision by the- judge, as provided for in the
4th sectiofn of the act. To this.tenderthe creditors objected, and'
they declined to receive the questions, or- to join in the issue, on
the grounds that their motionk had been granted, and that there
was no question or issue of law raised, inasmuch as section 26
of the act.lrovided distinctly that the court -might, on the application of any. creditor, at all times require the bankrupt to attend
and .submit to examination, and that if the bankrupt wished to.
raise . the question of tlie register's power to make the order
before the return of the warrant, he could .take the opinion of the
judge, by a certificate of the register, under the provisions of
section 6 of the act. The register declined to grant the motion
of the bankrupt to adjourn the, question into court, inasmuch as
there was 'no issue joined, and decided that the proper course
under the law, if the bankrupt questioned the right to mak the
order for examination before the warrant was returned, and decided,
to take the opinion of the judge thereon, was to do so by certificate of the register under the provision of section 6 of tle act.
BLATCHFORD, J.-The order requires the examination to take
place on -the 9th of October. The bankrupt objected to the
action of the register, and reqilested four questions to be certified
to the judge, which has accordingly been done by the register.
1. Whether the matter of granting the motion for an order for
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examination should not have been adjourned into court for the
decision of the judge ; and whether, after the bankrupt had tendered his points at issue, the register did not err in granting said
motion, and in refusing to adjourn the same into court for the
decision of the judge.
As regards this question, the register states that he thinks t.hat
it was not necessary to adjourn the matter into court; firstly,
because issue was not joined between the parties; secondly,
because section 6 provides a sufficient, and the most clear way to
take the opinion of the jhdge on the point without suspending
proceedings in the matter.
The question of granting the motion for an order for examination ought.to have been adjourned into court for the decision of
the judge.
The 4th section of the act requires, that "in all matters where
an issue of fact or of law is raised and contested by any party to
the proceedings," before the register, "it shall be his duty to
cause the question or issue to be stated by the opposing parties
in writing, and he shall adjourn the same into court for the decision by the judge."
Now the objection made by the bankrupt before the register to
the granting of the order for examination, on the ground that the
order could not be made before the first meeting of creditors,
raised an issue of law, which was contested. That issue it was
the duty of the register to adjourn into court for decision by the
judge. Instead of so doing he granted the motion, and thus
decided the issue of the law himself. But the bankrupt after
raising the issue of law, appears to have argued it, and submitted
it for decision to the register without requesting the register to
adjourn it into court, and withoutobjecting to its decision by the
register. The granting by the register of the motion of the creditor disposed of the question, and after that there was no issue
or question to be adjourned. It is the duty of the register to
adjourn an issue of law into court without any request to that
effect by a contesting party. But still such adjournment is a
proceeding which a contesting party may waive, and where he
does waive it, by submitting the decision of the issue to the
register, he cannot, after finding that the question is decided
against him by the register, then ask to have it adjourned into
court. If, instead of virtually requesting the register to decide
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the issue, by arguing the question, and awaiting the register's
decision, the bankrupt had, on raising the issue, requested the
register to adjourn it into court, the case would have presented a
different aspect. But as it was, the tendering by the bankrupt
of his points after the decision, imposed upon the register no
objection to adjourn them into court.
2. Whether under the Bankrupt Law Tupper & Beattie are
creditors, who have proved their claim so ag to entitle them to
make the motion. In regard to this question, the register states
that he considers Tupper & Beattie* to be creditors who have
proved their claim, they having fulfilled all the requirements of
the laws and there being no restriction as to the time when the
claim may be proved after proceedings are commenced; that the
first meeting of creditors is for the choice of an assignee by those
who have proved their claims; that he can see no reason why
creditors should wit until the return.day of the warrant to make
their proof; that the debt which exists is the basis of the right to
appear as creditor; and that creditors should be allowed to judg"
for themselves as to when they will take advantage of the law and
appear.
I concur, with the register in these views. The creditors in
this 0ase -hving proved their claim, had a right to make the
motion.
3. Whether before the day appointed for the first meeting of.
creditors, a creditor cah,'under the -act, prove his claim, and so
become a party to the proceeding in bankruptcy, as to be entitled
Eo an order for the examination of the bankrupt under the 26th
section of the act.
In regard to this question, the register states that he thinks
that when once a creditor has proved his claim, he has, unless thA
same be-questioned, full-right. under the law andmay at any time.
call for an examination of the bankrupt. The register is 1porrect
in this conclusion.
4. Whether if in the interval between the issuing of the warrant in bankruptcy and the day appointed for the first meeting
of creditors, and for proof of claims and choice of assignee, a
deposition in proof of a claim against the bankrupt is filed, it is
not tne duty of the register to notify the bankrupt or his attorney
before allowing the same, and entering it upon the list (Form
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No. 13), so that objection to the proof thereof may be made, if
any exist, under section 23 of the act.'
In regard to this question, the register states that he does not
think that the bankrupt need be notified of the filing of claims,
prior to the first meeting of creditors; that it is a matter of no
con.sequence to him whether creditors filq them before or after;
and that the bankrupt having surrendered all his property for the
benefit of all his creditors,,. could with perfect propriety and
,unected with his estate to them,
I.-nesty leave all questionFwithout regard to what L4, ition is made of it.
It is not the duty of the register to notify the bankrupt-or his
attorney before the first meeting of-creditors, of the filing of such
depositions in proof of claims, as may be filed before such first
meeting.
Notwithstanding the filing of such a deposition before such
first meeting, and the entering the claim, on a list (Form No. 18),
the register may still, at such first meeting, under section 23,
ppstpohe the proof of the claim, and exclude the creditor from
-voting in the choice of -an assignee.
The court has, under section 22, full control at all times of all
debts, and all proofs of debts, even after the depositions in proof
have been filed, and the bankrupt can at the first meeting of cre.
ditors, object, under section 23, to the validity of and the right
to prove any dbbts, no matter whether the deposition in proof
thereof -is filed at such first meeting or was filed previously.

District Court of th.e United States. Northern Districtof Ohio.
In Bankruptcy.
MATTER OF DAVIS & SON, BANKRUPTS.
A creditor holding security, although he has proved'his debt under section 22,
cannot vote in the election of an assignee.
iN this case A. C. "Gardner, a creditor of the bankrupt, 1rovbd
his claim before the register, being a debt secured by. mortgage
on real estate, and tho question arose whether he could be allowed to
vote at the' first meeting of creditors in the choice of an assig .nee.

J. A. Jones, for the bankrupt.
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Pay
1ne &. Wade, for the creditor.
The question and the register's opinion were certified to thecourt as follows, by
M. R. KEITH, Register.-Section 13 provides that the credit,
ors shall, at the first meeting held after due notice from the messenger, in the presence of a register designated by the court,
choose one or more assignees of the. estate of the debtor, the
choice to be made by the greater part in value and in number of
the creditors who have proved thW' debts.
-Sect. 23 provides that the cbinllgxall allow all debts duly
proved, and shall cause -a list thereof to be made and duly certified by one of the-registers.
-Sect. 20 provides that when a creditor has a mortgage or
pledge of real 6r personal property of the bankrupt, or 'a lien
thereon for securing the payment of a debt owing to him from the
bankrupt, he shall be admitted as a creditor only for-the balaiice
of the debt after deducting the value -of such property to be
ascertained by agreement between him and the assignee, or by a
sale thereof to be made in such manner as the court shall direct.
Sect. 13, above referred -to, allows all creditors who have
proved their- debts to participate in the choice of an assignee.
The- certified list of creditors required by section 23, is for the
purpose of spreading upon the record a statement of the names
of al admitted as creditors, .and the amount due to each.
Sect., 20 in my opinion so far as voting for assignee, limits the
creditors to those who are not secured,,for it provides that creditors holding security shall be admitted as'eieditorsonly for the
balance of their debts, after deducting the yalue of the security,
and that value -can only be determined by agreement between him
and the assignee, or by sale of the property, which cannot be
agreed 'on between them, or ascertained by sale until after the
assignee is chosen.
I am, therefore, of the opinion, that a creditor holding seburity,
although he has proved his debt as provided in the 22d section of
the Bankrupt Act, cannot votq in the election of assignee.
District Judge, concurred with the register in tho
foregoing opinion.
SHERMAN,

BUNCE v. GALLAGHEE.

niled States Circuit Court. Southern District of Nbew York.
In Equity.
-MARY E. BUNCE AND OTHERS v. JANE A. GALLAGHER AND
.MICHAEL SMITH.
Wjere a person bought andtook possession of a house under a forged deed, the

true owner is entitled, on a bill in equity, to have the deed and the record of it
declared void, and the deed delivered up to be cancelldd, and the purchaser enjoined
from assuming to sell the house to any one else.
It is not necessary that the title of the plaintiff should be established and possession obtained by an action at law.

The owner having in the trial of his complaint given the forged deed in evidence,
is entitled to prove the.forgery.
'Where the holder of the legal title is a plaintiff, the misjoinder of other parties
having an equitable interest will be disregarded unless the objection be taken by
demurrer or answer before answer on the merits.
OPINioN by
SHIP'MAN, J.-The complainants are citizens of Connecticut
and Massachusetts, and the respondents, citizens of New York.
The bill is brought to obtain the decree of this court annulling
and declarin, void a certain alleged- forged deed, and the record
thereof, purporting to convey to the respondent Gallagher the
title to a house and two lots of land situated on Staten Island, in
the state of New York, and removing the cloud on the genuine
title which this alleged forged instrument has thrown over*it;
and also to cancel a certain agreement entered into between the
respondents for the sale and transfer of the premises in question
to the respondent Smith, and to restrain them from consummating
the same, or'any similar contract.
Though.the obj6cts sought by the bill are simple, the facts an4
legal questions involved in the controversy are numerous and complicated. A detailed statement of the material fActs is therefore
indispensable to a clear understanding of the points to be decided.
Mary. E. Bunce, one of the complainants, is a daughter of the late
John W. Bull, of Hartford, Connecticut." In September 1861.
he gave her full powei'of attorney to transact all his business..
On the 4th oi April 1862, she purchased for her father,' under
this power of attorney, the icilse which is the subject of this controversy, and took the deed in her own -name. The consideiation, however, came from his estate, and -she held the prot-ty
avowedly for his benefit.
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This property, which lies in the town of Southfield, New York,
was purchased subject to a mortgage, which was subsequently
foreclosed, and a sale made by the sheriff of Richmond 'county.
Mary E. Bull, assuming to act as her father's agent, under the
letter of attorney, purchased in the property, and as before, and
for the same reasons, and with the same object, took the deed in
her own name. This sheriff's deed was executed March 20th
1863. Thus Mary 1. Bull became invested with the legal title
to this property by the two deeds referred to, both of which were
*duly recorded in the office of the clerk of Richmond county.
On the 9th of July-1863, John W. Bull died, leaving five
children, viz., thefour who have joined in this bill, and John W.
Jr. He left a will, dated the 10th of May 1868, which was duly
proved before th'e Court of Probate for the District of-Hartford,
July 15th 1863. One of the terms of this will was that all future
acquisitions of real estate should be embraced in and pass by it.*
After a specific devise of ihe homestead of the testator in Hart..
ford, with the -furniture and movable property connected with-it,
to, his two daughters, the remainder of- his estate, real and per.
soixal is given to'the two daughters and sons who are named as
complainonts in this bill.. Nothing was given, by the will, to the
other son,*John W. Bull, Jr.
On the 28d of May 1864, Mary E.Bunll executed and delivered
a de~d of this property on Staten Island, together with other real.
estate therein described, to Henry R.- W. "Welch, one of the complainants in this bill, in trust. On'the same day, Welch executed
an instrument, purporting to be a declaration" of the trust under
which he received this deed'from Mary E. Bull, and sets foith,
so far as this property is concerned, that he holds'it as trustee
for all the devisees named in the will of John W. Bull, who are
declared to be the equitable owners thereof.
On the 28th of May 1864, Mary E. Bull was married to Francis M. Bunce, who is. also joined as a complainant in the bill.
In 1865, two instruments were found on record in Richmond
county, describing the house and lots; one a mortgage purporting
to be signed and acknowledged by Mary E. Bull, to secure the
payment of $1060 to Harriet G, and Louisa Moore, and dated
December 15th 1863 ; the other an absolute deed, also purporting to be signed and acknowledged by Mary E. Bull, dated March
VoL. XVI.---

,

84

BUNCE v. GALLAGHER.

2d 1864, conveying the premises to Jane Ann Gallagher. Both
these deeds were signed with the name of Mary E. Bull.
On the trial it was proved that these deeds bad been executed
by an impostor. She did not even resemble the genuine Mary
i. Bull. She succeeded, however, in passing herself off as such,
deceiving the counsel, to whom the genuine Mary E. Bull was a
stranger, and obtaining the money of the Moores and of Mrs.
Gallagher. The mortgage and deed were recorded in the clerk's
office in Richmond county, and Mrs. Gallagher, with her husband,
went into possession on the 14th of March 1864. Her husband
subsequently died, but Mrs. Gallagher has continued in possession of the premises by herself and tenants till the present time.
Among her tenants was Michael Smith, the other respondent in
this bill, with whom Mrs. Gallagher entered into negotiations for
the sale of this property to him.
Of course this mortgage to the Moores and, the deed to Mrs.
Gallagher are mere forgeries, and conveyed no title. The bill
is brought to annul the deed to Mrs. Gallagher, to require her to
deliver it up, to be cancelled, and to declare the r"ecord of it void,
and also to -restrain her and -Smith by injunction from consummating their negotiations for the sale of the property to him, and
to prevent her from assuming to sell it to any one else.
There can be no dispute as to the facts. The proof is overwhelming that neither Mary E. Bunce (formerly Mary E. Bivll)
nor any one of the other complainants, nor any other person who
had any right or title to this property, had any knowledge, or
were in law chargeable with -any knowledge of this pretended
deed, or th6 possession of Mrs. Gallagher under it, until about a
year after its execution and the, entry of Mrs. Gallagher, who
had been thus unwittitngly made the victim of a fraud and imposture. The defence to the bill .is therefore technical, and turns
upon questions, of law.
The respondents insist:1st. That this court has no jurisdiction; at least in the present
state of things, as the complainants, or real owners, have adq.
quate remedy at law, and must first resort to ejectment, and settle
the title and obtain possession of the premises.
2d. That the bill should be dismissed for a misjoinder of par.
ties complainant.
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3d. That improper evidence was received -on the trial, wlhich,"
if rejected, leaves material allegations of the bill without proof.
We will consider first whether the complainants have adequate
remedy at law in the just and proper sense of that term. - This
is important, inasmuch as the 16th section of the Judiciary Act
provides, "That suits in equity shall not be sustained by either
of the courts of the United States where a plain, adequate, and
complete remedy at l1w can be had." It has been held that this
provision is merely declaratory, and does not exclude the courts
of the United States from any part of the field of equitable
remedies: Baker v. Biddle, 1 Bald. 405; Boyce v. Grundy, 3
Peters 210. In the latter case Mr. Justice JOHNSON, in delivering the opinion of. the court, uses this emphatic language: "This
court has often been called upon to consider the 16th section of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, and as often, either expressly, or by
the course of its decisions, has held that it is merely declaratory,
making no alteration whatever" in the rules -of equity on the subject of legal remedy. It is not enough that there is remedy at
law; it must be plain and adequate; or, in other words, as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity." The question, ,thei, arises
whether the bill before us, on the general principles of equity
jurisprudence, presents a case of equity jurisdiction. And it is
proper to reui.rk here that the fact that the deed in question is a
void instrument does not-take the case out of the jurisdiction in
equity: Pierollv. Elliott, 6 Peters 95; Hfamilton v. CJummins,
1 Johns. Ch. R. 517. Numerous authorifies -might be cited in
support of this doctrine, but it is not necessary in the present
ease, as the respondents' counsel concede the point. They, however, inst that before the complainants can come into a court
of equity for the relief sought by this bill, they, or whoever is
the legal owner, must establish title and obtain possession by
ejectment at law. The argument at bar in support of this claim
proceeded upon the assumption that the bill presented -the case
of a doubtful and disputed title, and that as courts of equiity do
not adjudicate simple questions of title to land, no relief can be
granted. But this difficulty is not presented by the bill. There
is no question of title involved between the complainants and the
respondents, except that involved in the question whether the
deed is forged or not. This forged deed has. not impaired or
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complicated the title to this land. It has thrown a cloud over it,
especially as it stands on the records of lands in the county wher6
the property is situated, and this cloud obscures the true state of
the title, and is well calculated to lead to misapprehension, em.
barrassment, and mistaken litigation. As the invalidity of the"
deed does not appear on its face, but can only be made apparent
by* extrinsic evidence, it is peculiarly the duty of a court of
equity to sweep it away. The case of Ward v. -Dewey, 16 N.
Y., cited by the respondents on the point, concedes this doctrine.
PR ATT, J., at p. 522, says: "But where such claim appears valid"
upon the face of the record, and the defect can only be made to
appear by extrinsic evidence, particularly if that evidence -depends
upon oral testimony to establish it, it presents a case for invoking
the aid of a court of equity to remove it as a cloud on the title.
The case of fraud in procuring a deed to be executed which
aparently conveys the title *
is a familiar illustration."
There is here no controversy about a doubtful title between these
parties; and the question of possession has no legal relation to
the object now sought to be attained by the decree of this court..
But it is said there is great -doubt as to which of-the complain.
ants holds the legal title, and as'the equitable power. of the court
can only be exercised in aid of the legal owner, the legal owner'
must be ascertained before the court can entertain jurisdictiop.But this objection goes only to the question whether the proper
parties have been made complainants in the bill. Some one is
entitled to have this -spurious and. fraudulent deed which now
clouds the title to -this property #wept off. Whethei thaitright
pertains to these complainants we will now consider, in disposing
of the respondents' second main objection, viz., that there is an,
improper joinder of parties complainant.
As a general rule. all the parties in interest should be j6ined in
a bill either as complainants or respondents, whether these interests-be equitable merely, or legal. While it isnot always necessary to join all who have an interest in the subjQct.mat'cer of the
suit, tho se who have an interest in the object sought to be attiine.
by the suit must be joined: Story's Eq. Plead., §§ 72-136 Vt seq.
Those whose interests are in harmony, and only those,'should be
joined as complainanfs: Saumerez-v. Saumerez, 4 M. & 0. 336.
Now, it is evident that the interests of all the devisees of John
W. Bull, named in the bill, are in harmony:. There is not only
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no conflict or variance between these interests, but all these-devisees are concerned in the relief which this bill seeks. This will
be seen by recurring to facts already stated. Mary E: Bull purchased this property with her father's money, avowedly as his
agent, taking the title in her own name solely as a matter of convenience and to enable her to transfer it with facility. She had
been acting under a power of attorney given her by her father
when he was competent to execute such an instrument. But at
the time she purchased this property of Root, as well as at the
time when the sheriff's deed was made'to her, her father's mental
powers had so far decayed as to render him incapable of legally
transacting any business. The authority, therefore, conferred
upon her originally by this letter of attorney was extinguished, or,
at least, suspended, .y his mental incapacity. This is well-settled
doctrine, though it has been intimated that before the -authority
of an agent can be suspended by the insanity of the principal
occurring after the execution of the power, the fact of lunacy
must be established under an inquisition. Still, I apprehend,
that wflether the fact were formally established or not, the agent
could not justify or support an act upon the authority originally
given, done after the agent had knowledge of the incapacity of
his principal: Story on Agency 481, note. But this question is not
material here.. Mary E. Bull evidently acted under the mistaken
idea .that the authority conferred upon her by the power of'attor-.
ney was still in force. "But, whatever her notion was, she acted
in good faith, purchasing this property for-and on acoount of her
father, as she supposed, in the interest of hig estate, paying for it
out of his funds, and avowedly holding it.for his benefit. She
held the legal title, but the property in equity belonged to him.
By his will, his equitable interests passed to his devisees, though
one of them, the daughter, continued to hold the legal title. But
it is objected that the four complainants, who are devisees.under
John W. Bull's will, are in no condition to maintain any suit
touching real estate in the state of New York, because tte will
has never been proved and admitted to probate in the latter state.
But this suit ought not to fail upon a merely formal and technical point like this. Courts of equity are slow .to dismiss suits
for want of proper or the joinder of improper parties, where the
difficulty can be remedied, or where they can give the relief
sought without impairing or jeopardizing the interest of any one.

BUNCE v. GALLAGHER.

Rather than that the suit should fail, I should feel bound to with
hold the decree until this supposed defect could be cured by a
probate of the will in this state.
But in the first place it is doubtful whether it was indispensable
for any one of these devisees, as such, to be joined as complainants. The holder of the legal title could maintain the bill without compromising any of the rights given by the will. 'But joining those who have equitable interests in the subject-matter would
be unobjectionable, or at least, if the misjoinder is apparent on
the face of the bill, it should have been taken advantage of by
way of demurrer, or, at all events, by answer. Now the will of
John W. Bull, the deed of Mary E; Bull to Welch, in triast, and
the declaration in trust by the latter executed at the same time
as the deed, are referred to in tha bill and annexed thereto as
exhibits. The alleged misjoinder was, therefore, apparent on the
face of the bill; and should have been taken advantage of by
demurrer.
.Mr. Justice Story, in his Equity Pleadings, § 544, says,
-4 In cases of misjoinder of plaintiffs, the objection ought to be
taken by deinurrer, for if not so taken, and the court proceeds to
i hearing on the merits, it will be disregarded, at least if it does
not materially affect the. propriety of the decree." The bill
shows that these devisees claim an interest in this property under
the will of their father, who died in Connecticut; the place of his
domicil,- where his will was proved and his estate went into settlement. There is no allegation that the will was proved in New
York. "The misjoinder alleged is put upon the ground Qf want
of interest, but this was apparent on the bilf, and as it was not
demurred to, muiit.be deemed to have been waived: 4 Paige
510.
Certainly the court cannot regard~it in the present stage of the
suit, especially as this misjoinder, if it be one, in no way affects
the propriety of.the decree asked for, either gs that decree may
affect the interests of complainants or respondents.
But the propriety 6f m.king Mary E. Bull, one of the deviseep,
a party complainant, is not open to objection of any kindfor she
holds the legal title to this property under the sherijF's deed to
her. Her deed to Welch, on the 28d of May 1864, was void
under the statute of New York. She -was out of possession,
though she did not know it at the time. Mrs. Gallagher was in

BUNCE v. GALLAGHER.

possession under color of title. The fact that the deed under
which the latter claimed was void makes no difference. Her possession was adverse, for she was in actual personal posgession ;
and the fact of possession and the quo animo of the possessor are
the tests by which to determine the question whether the possession
is adverse or not: La Yomboir v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 589. Mary
E. Bull, therefore, has never parted with the legal title to this
property. The only'deed she has ever made was that to Welch,
and that was void. She is therefore, beyond all question, a pro'per party to this suit.
Of course it follows that as Welch took no title to this property,
he has no intere# of any kind, and therefore should not have
been joined. But this fact was apparent on the face of the bill,
in connection with the fact of Mrs. Gallagher's possession, which
was well known, of dourse, to her and Smith, her co-respondent.
This .bjection should, therefore, have been taken in an early
stage of the case. The respondefits anawered to the merits alone.
They should have taken advantage of the misjoinder of Welch in
their answer. (Lord LANGDALE, in the case of Raffity v. King,
Vol. 6,1"Law Journal N. S. 98.) His misjoinder in no way embarrasses the respondents, nor can it in any manner affect the
propriety of the decree. It will, therefore, be disregarded.
On the hearing the complainants exhibited the forged deed described in the bill, and proceeded to prove by Mrs. Bunce that the
signature purporting -to- be hers was a forgery. They also
offered Mr. Gardiner, who made the certificate of acknowledgment
on the forged instrument, to prove that thie person who executed
it was not Mrs. Bunce, the real owner, although he supposed sa at
the time. To this evidence the respondents objected on the ground
that it was not competent for the complainants thus to discredit
papers -which they had -produced in evidence. But the rule upon
which this objection rests lias no application to a suit of this
character. The complainants are no parties to these instruments,
and are therefore at liberty to-prove their spurious character.*
Let a-decree be entered in accordance with the prayer of the
bill against both respondents. No costs will be'allowed against
the respondent Smith.
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Supreme Court of North Carolina.
PHILLIPS v. HOOKER.
Confederate treasm notes were not an illegal consideration in contracts bet'een
citizens of the Confederate States, unless it was the intent of the parties to tbt con.
tract thereby to aid the rebellion.
Therefore, where one citizeni of North Carolina, in 1862, bought a house of another, paid for it in Confederate notes, and went into possession, the contract cannot be set aside by a court as founded on an illegal consideration.

IN 1862the defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiff a house
and lot, and received $2500 in Confederate treasury notes as
the consideration, and put him in -possession. The contract had
no special poli tical significance, and there was no averment that it
was entered into with an intent to give aid to the rebellion.
PEARSON, C. J.-The right of the plaintiff to relief aoes not
rest alone upon the ordinance of the convention, or the act of the.
legislaturd, but upon the broad ground that the courts are bound
*to administer justice and enforce the execution of contracts.
The contract is to be taken as a dealing in the ordinary'transaction of business. The plaintiff -bought the house and lot because
it suited him. The defendant took the Confederate notes because
she needed funds.
It is said every dealing in Confederate,- treasury notes .gave
them credit and circulation, and consequently aided the rebellion;
so every such dealing.was illegal; and not fit to be enforced by
the courts, without. reference to "the intent of-the pirties. The
proposition"is general; every man and woman who, in the ordi.
nary course of business, received a Confederate note, did an
illegal act, tainted with treaion: it embraces all contracts, as ".ell
contracts executed as executory. ; for, if true as -to one; it aims a
blow at all. dealings among_
people during the war, and
upheaves the foundations of society. I do not believe the proposition can be maintained by any -authority or any principle of
law.
1.. It may be conceded that, if, at the outbreak of an insuirec.
tion, parties to contracts, with a iliew of aiding tia'cause,by
giving credit and circulation to its-paper, receive -it as money in
their dealing, such contracts are illegal. But that.is not the case under consideration.
-our

-
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In 1862 the contest had assumed the magnitude and propor
tions of war; each party in territorial limits had the boundaries
of a mighty nation, and each party counted its people by millions.
The "Confederate States" was recognised by the nations, and by
the United States itself, as a belligerent power, entitled to the
rights of war, and, in the exercise of its powers, it had issued papei
as the representative.of money, which included all other currency,
and constituted the only circulating medium of the country.
The government of the United States was unable to protect the
people, and there was no currency but Confederate treasury
notes.. In this condition of things, was every man to stop his
ordinary avocations and' starve; or else be tainted with treason,
and deemed guilty of an illegal act if he received a Confederate
treasury note?:
The Attorney-General of the United States, in his opinion on
the subject of disfranchisement, uses this language: " Officers in
those rebel states who, during the rebellion, discharged official
duties not incident to'war, but in the'preservation of order and
the adininistration of law, are not to be- considered ds thereby
engaging in rebellion. The -interest of humanity requires such
official conduct in time of peace, and the performance of such
duties can.never be considered as criminal." Was a judge to
cease to do thl6se "duties required by the interests of humaniity,
the performance of which can never be considered as criminal ;".
of was he to perform the 'duties and starve, rather than commit an'
illegal act by receiving his salary in 6onfcderate treasurynotes?
Was' the merchant to close his store, the blacksmith and shoemaker to quit work, and the farmer to let his tobacco and surplus
grain rot on his hands, and allow his family to suffer for cIothing
and the other necessaries of life, or do an illegal act by receiving
Confederate notes ? Really, unless the. receiving of such notes
can be connected with a criminal intent to aid the rebellipn, the
question seems to me too plain to admit of argument. A: naked
statement exposes the absurdity of the proposition. Th courts
must act on the presumption that Confederate notes were received
in ordinary dealing-not for the purpose of aiding the rebellion,
but because there was no other currency.
2. Look at the subject in another point of view: At the closeof the war the President granted amnesty and pardon to all, save
Q,very few individuals. Congress in the act for reconstruction
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disfranchised only those who, having taken an oath tD support the
Constitution of the United States, afterwards engaged actively
in the rebellion, and has refused to enforce the rigorous measure
of confiscation. On what principle, then, can it be, that the
courts are called upon to take up the matter "at the little end,"
search into the private dealings of -the people, and all the ramifications 'of ordinary business, and declare of no force-in effect
confiscate-all contracts based upon the 6onsideration of Confederate notes ? Whdt good can result from this action of the courts?
It can have no effect upon the rebellion-for it is over. It can
have no effect upon the future, for "necessity knows no law ;"
and whenever a condition of things occurs in'which the people
must use the only-currency, it will be used. The idea of the
courts assuming the duty of preventing civil wars by holding that
it is illegal .to receive the paper of rebels, in brdinary busines-s
transactions, whii there is no other currency-that such contracts
are not fit to be enforced-presents to my mind a palpahle
absurdity. So, what good will be done by this action of the courts?
'None, save only to show, on the part of the courts, a detestation
of treason, by treading on the' extremities of the monster after it
ih dead.
3. In Blossom..v. Van Amringe, 1 Phil. 133, the maxim ez.
furpi causa actio non oritur, was pressed on the court, and it was
insisted that, as the parties had made a transfer of property; in
fraud and deceit, with an-intent to evade the .confiscation adts
of the government of the Confederate States, the case fell under
the maxim. The court says: "The objection would no doubt
have been fatal, if taken before -a court of the de facto state
government, while it formed a part of the Confederate states;
but this court is a co-ordinate brinch of a rightful government,
forming a part of'the United States,'and cannot entertain such an
objection." In our case the matter is reversed. The turpitude,
if any, was aimed at the United States, and" the maxim applies,
provided there be the criminal intent. "Thatis the question. I
deny. the intent; there is no evidence of it or anything from
which it can be implied. It cannot be held that the mere xeceiving a Confederate note was illegal and base, without involving in
the imputatioii of baseness every man and woman in the state.
The minister of the gospel, the judge, who received their salaries;
the physician, the merchant, the mechanic, the farmer, who c~r
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ried on their ordinary business. The poor seamstresses, who at
the end of the day received their hard-earned wages, were all
guilty of an act so base that the doors of the courts of justice
must be shut against them.
The proposition is monstrous.
During the war a farmer should not have made more grain than
enough to support himself and family: making a surplus was
illegal-it aided the -rebellion. If every man had quit work, the
rebel army could not have been sustained; the war would have
stopped by starvation. We were told jn the argument that ' gold
as well as iron is a sinew of war." It may be added, meat and
bread are also sinews of war-reductio ad absui'dum.
4. But it is said, the consequences of holding all such dealing
to have be~n ill.gal, will not be so grievous after all,, for in its
practical application, the maxim will only make void executory
contracts. The principle, if a sound one, evidently in~ludes all
contracts, executed as well- as executory, and the admission that
in-practice it can only be made to 'reach the latter, demonstrates
the impotence and absurdity of this action of the courts, as the
means of putting a stop to civil wars. " Let us see how it is to
operate: A man buys a tract of land, pays for it in Confederate
notes and takes a deed. The court cannot reach him, for it is
met by thd "in pari delicto melior est conditio defendentis;" so
he keeps the -land, not because he is innocent, but because the
court cannot take it from-him and restore it to the original owner,
for he is equally guilty. If one has'paid off a bond in'Confederate notes, whether the creditor will lie allowed to sue on the
original debt, which is not tainted with this "turpi causa," ig a
problem that I will not undertake to solve. •
But suppose the bond is only paid in part; the payment must
be rejected, for, being in Confederate notes' it is of no more legal
effect than if made in counterfeit money; or suppose in our case
Mr. Hooker brings ejectment for the land; the contract has been
in part performed, and the defendant is in possession, v-ill the
court shut its doors against her on the maxim in pari delidto ? In
short, is the practical application of this novel principle to be
allowed to cover all intermediate cases, when the contract has
not been fully executed; or is it to be confined to contracts wholly
executory, where the purchaser has paid the -price, but in the
simplicity of his innocence has neglected to take a deed, and has
not even taken possession? The amount of it is, all who required
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the Confederate notes to be paid down or who have taken deeds
and acquittances under seal, although equally guilty, are to go
unpunished, and only those who gave credit to their neighbors or
who neglected to take deeds are to be made victims to the vengeance of the law, while the remiss debtors and dishonest vendors
are, to be the sole gainers, although equal participants in the illegal acts. Lame and impotent conclusion.
Thus encouragement is to be given to dishonesty, justice is not
to be administered, and the people of the country are to be involved in utter Perplexity and confusion in order to make a useless show of zeal on the.part of the courts "to punish rebels."
READE, J.-I:- propose to consider only so much of the case as
involves the question whether Confederate treasury notes, which'
were paid for the land, were an illegal consideration. For, very
clearly, if the eonsideration was illegal, the contract will not be
enforced in this court. I shall treat it as a dry legal question.
A contract is not void merely because it tends to promote ille.
_gal or immoral purposes: Hilliard on Sales 876.; Armstrong v.
Toler, 11 Wheat. 258; Stbry's Conflict of Laws 258.
"
A contract for the sale of a -house and- lot is not vitiated by
the fact that the vendor knows, at the time of making it, that the
vendee intends it for an immoral or illegal purpose: Armfield v.'
Tate, 7 Ired. 259.
A sale of goods is not void although the seller knows that they
ae wanted for.an illegal purpose; unless he has a part in. the illegal purpose: Hodgson v. Temple, 5 Taunt. 181. In'ihich case
MANSFIELi , C. J., says: "I The merely selling goods, knowing
that the buyer will make an illegal use of them, is not sufficient
to deprive the vendor of his just right of his payments." ' In.Daterv. Earl,8 Gray (Mass.) 482, the court says: "1If the illegal
use to be made of the goods enters into the contract and forms the
motive or inducement in the mind of the vendor or lender to the
gale or loan, then he cannot recover, provided the goods or money
are actually used to carry out the contemplated design; but bare
knowledge on the part 6f the vendor that the vendee infends to
put the goods or money to an illegal use will not vitiate'the sale
or loa.n, and deprive the vendor of all remedy for the purchase
money."
Where goods are bought from an enemy,even in his own terri.
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tory, by a citizen of the United States, the sale is valid, and the
price may be recovered, although the act might be a misdemeanor
and the property liable as a prize : Coolidge v. Inglee, 13 Mass.
26. Authorities are abundant to the same effect.
It will be seen, therefore, that a contract is not void because
there is something immoral or illegal in its surroundings or conneftions. And yet it is equally certain that a contract is void.
when the consideration is illegal or immoral.' What, then, is the
criterion ? Probably the following cases will show the dividing
'line: Goods were sold to a man who *intended to smuggle them
and defraud the revenub, and the vendor knew of the design; it
Was held ihat the contract was valid, and the vendor could recover
the price: .Holmanv. Joinson)Cowp. 341. But goods were sold
to a man who intended to smuggle them and defraud the revenue,
and the vendor not only knew .of the purpose, but put them up in
a particular manner so-as to enable it to be done ; -itwas held, that
the contract was void, and that the price could not be recovered:
Briggs v. Lawrence, 3 Term Rep. 454. Now what is the difference between the two cases ? None, except that in the latter
case it was a part of the arrangement, and entered into the intent
of the parties that the thing should be done. All.these authorities
show that the. sntent of the partibs to accomplish the illegal thing
is necessqry to vitiate the contract; and therefore, in the -case
befoge us, unless the intent of the parties in their contradt was to.
aid the rebellion, the fact that it did, it (if it did) by giving currency to the notes, does not vitiate it.,
It is not- pretended that the Confederate treasury notes were
of no value. It is conceded that they were.of value, and that, at
the time of the sale in 1862. less than two dollars of the notes
would buy one dollar of gold. But it is contended that although
of value they were illegal. In what sense were they so ? In no
case can the thing used as a consideration, of itself and independent of the intention of the parties, invalidate the contiact if
the thing be of value, unless, perhaps, by express statute.: There
is nothing which may not be turned to mischief in its use, as
poisons, deadly weapons, and the like; but still they are sufficient
considerations 'to support contracts, unless it be the intent of the
sale to do mischief. The case of Bandon v. Toby, 11 How. 493,
is very strong in point. In that case Africans had been imported
and sold as slaves, which is forbidden by law. The vendor brought
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suit for the price of one which he had sold; and the defence was
that the consideration was illegal. The court says: "The plea
that the notes were given for African negroes imported into Texas
after 1833 is unavailable. On the argument here, it was endeavored to be supported on the ground that the notes were void,
because the introduction of African negroes into Texas was contrary to law. If these notes had been given on a contract to do a
thing forbidden by law, undoubtedly they would be void. Neither
of the parties had anything to do with the original contract, nor
was their contract made in defiance of law. "The crime committed by those who introduced the negroes into the country does
not attach to those who may afterwards. purchase them. As
respects the defendant, therefore, he has received the full consideration of his notes." And then follows this strong language
by the court: "If the defendant should be sued for'his tailor's
bill, and com'e into court with the clothes made for hin on his
back, aid plead that he was not bound to pay for-them because
the importer had smuggled the cloth, he would present a case of
eqial merits and parallel with the present; but ..
d would not be
likely to have the verdict of the jury or the judgment of the
oourt.$?
So, in the case before us, it is conceded that itwas illegal to
issue the treasury notes, just as it was illegal to. import the
negroes; but the illegality is in the issuing in the one place- and
in the importing in 'the other, and does not attach to those who
afterwards use the thing issued or imported. 'IAwa insisted, in
the argument before us, that -the value of the tre~siiry notes
depended upou their circulation, and that the parties, by using
them in their contract, 'aided in their circulation; so, in the cade
just quoted, the value of the importation of negroes depended
upon their sale, and the transaction between the parties aided
their sale, and, in that way, encouraged importation. The fact
was nndoubtedly true, yet it did not render -the contract void.
The illegality consisted in their importation and not iht
theii use
after importation; so- the illegality consisted in the issuing 3f
treasury notes, and not ifitheir use after- they were issued. * If
balls, which had been shot in battle, had been found and sold, it
might as well -be said that the consideration was illegal, because
they had been made for, and used in, the rebellion: In Qoolidge
v.Inylee, 8upra, the case was that in the war of. 1812, a citizen
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of the United States bought goods of"the enemy contrary to law,
and brought them to the United States and sold them, and,'when
he sued the purchaser for the price, he set up the defence that it
was unlawful for the plaintiff to have bought the goods, and that,
therefore, the, consideration of the contract was illegal ; but the
court held the contrary. It is absurd to suppose that the goods
in that case, or the treasury notes in this, were illegal. Were not
the goods precisely the same as if they had been bought of a
friendly power ? Certainly. The goods were not illegal) but the
-tradingwith the enemy was.
This is the first time that this very important question has come
before us for consideratibn. It has been well argued and patiently
considered. We are not without important aid in determining
the question: It.'was well considered by the convention of.1865,
and the legislatures which have since assembled. The convention
was prompt to declare that the rebellion, and everything in aid of
it, was illegal. And it declared void all contracts which were in
aid of it; but it did not declare void all contracts, the consideration of. which were Confederate treasury notes ; on the contrary,
it plainly declared such contracts valid ; that all contracts made
during the war shall be deemied to be payable in money of the
value of said .notes; and directed the legislature to prepare a
scale to show, not that said notes were of no value, but to show
what their value really was. And the legislature did prepare
such'a scale. Now, if. the defence set up in this case be good,
then the convention and legislatures ought to have made short
work of it, and declared that all contracts should be deemed to be
payable in Confederate tteasury notes ; and that such notes were
illegal as a consideration to support a contract, andi therefore,
that all such contracts were void. I do not consider the question
whether the convention or the legislatures had the power to
validate or invalidate contracts, but their actions are cited to show
that those bodies regarded these notes as valuable, and considera.
tions to support contracts. We thus have the concurrent opinions
of the judiciary, the convention, and the legislature of th6 state,
and an uninterrupted train of decisions both in England and the
United States on kindred subjects, that Confederate treasury
notes are not illegal considerations in contracts between citizens:
unless it was the intent of the parties to the contract therey to
sid the rebellion.
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Our attention was called to an abstract of a case decided in
Tennessee, in which Confederate treasury notes were held to be
an illegal consideration. We regret that we have not the case at
large. It seems to have been decided upon the.ground'that it
was the money of rebels. Suppose it had been the coin, of
rebels. Doubtless there is some better reason than that. It
would be an encouragement to rebels and to rebellion to-exonerate
them from a porformance of their contracts because of their
participation in so great a mischief. If the judiciary could be
influenced at all -by this consideration, it wduld hold them to
a more rigid performance of all their undertakings. As a court,
we neither favor or oppress rebels, bift hold the scales of justice
even. But we forbear further comment, lest we do our sister
court injustice.
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RICHARD P.. BRUFF, EXECUTOR, v. HIPPOLITE MALI AND OTIS
P. JEWETT.
/

In b suit by a purchaser of stock against the president of a corporation to re-

cover the value of sto6k fraudulently over-issued by him, the plaintiff must prove
that the certificates purchased by him did not represent genuine stock.

The plaintiff having proved that his certificates were issued after the entire stock
authorized by law had been taken-and certificates issued therefor, the burden was
then shifted to the dofendants to prove thit plaintiff's stock was issued on the surrender or transfer of genuine stock.
Unless *this.evidence clearly and indisputably establishes the genuixeness of
plaintiff's stock, the question should be submittedto the jury.

The authentication of certificates of stock by the president of a corporation by
his signature in the usual mode, is equivalent to a continuing and renewed guarantee to successive purchasers, that the stock is genuine, and the plaintiff is not
bound to prove Jhat he purchased his* ertificate -directly from the president or the
company.

THis 'was an iction brought by Shotwell,. since de6eased, and
now prosecuted by his executor, substituted as plaintiff in t~le
cause.
A recovery was had against Mali and Jewett, former president
and vice-president of the Parker Vein Coal Company, a corporation created by the laws of Maryland, having its -principal place
of business-in New York.
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The complaint contained three separate counts or causes of
action. In the first, after an averment that the plaintiff, was a
stockholder, it was charged that the defendants misconducted in
their office of president and vice-president, and wrongfully and
fraudulently over-issued the stock of the company, by reason of
which the plaintiff's stock was rendered unsaleable and valueless. In the Iecond, it was charged that the defendants made
false and fraudulent representations in regard to the financial
affairs of the company, whereby the plaintiff was induced to
purchase stock of the company which in fact was valueless. In
the third, it was averred that the defendants, as officers of the
company, and after the whole amount of the capital stock had
been issued, made and issued other certificates purporting to be
genuine certificates o'f shares of the capital stock of the company,
which were false and fraudulent, and sold and dispoged of the
same as true and genuine stock; 480 shares of which the plaintiff purchased and received as genuine, to his great damage:
The .recovefy was under the third count, and the questions
presented to this court for examination 'arose under the appeal
by the defendants from the judgment having its basis on that
count.
The opinion.of the court was delivered by
BocKEs, J.-It may be well to examine the case in the order
in which the questions* arose on th6 trial. It was not disputed
that the defendants, Mali and Jewett, were officers of the company. Both were directors, the former its president and the latter
its vice-president. Nor was it controverted before the court on
the trial, that after the whole capital stock was filled and certificates for the entire amount issued, the defendants without authority continued to make further and over-issues to an.erroneous
and ruinous amount. It was proved, or there was evidence tending to prove, that the fraudulent or over-issues were made prior
to the time when the plaintiff made his purchases, and prior to
the date of the certificates of stock issued to them-in small
numbers at first and afterwards freely-and that the over-issues
were made by the defendants deliberately, from time to time, as
inducements were suggested. The authorized capital stock was
3,000,000.
The spurious stock, from over-issues, exceeded
$12,000,000.
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Under this state of facts the plaintiff rested the case, and the
defendants moved for a dismissal of the. complaint. The judge
remarked in substance, that it appeared from the evidence that
the plaintiff's certificates of stock were issued after the stock was
full and over-issues had commenced, and that, in the absence of
evidence that the certificates were given on the surrender of stock,
it was for the jury t6 say whether they were gefiuine . and he
denied the motion. This ruling was manifestly correct. The
genuine certificates were all out before those -obtained by the
plaintiff were issued. There was no proof then that any of the
genuine certificates had been surrendered and new ones issued in
their place. It might well be that there had been, but there was
no proof of it in the case.. There was only a suspicioh growing
out of a probability, because the stock,-or what purported to be
the stock, of .the company had been in the market.
Therepon evidence was given by the defendaluts to tie effect
that, from a time prior. to the' purchase by, the plaintiff of his
stock, there were surrenders and transfers of certificates to a very'
great extent daily at the office of the company. . But the witness
was unable fo say whether such surrenders and transfers were of
the genuine or spurious stocks-at least" he did not identify a
single transaction of the kind where the stock was issued prior to"
the issuing of the spurious certificates ; and in regard to the
certificates held by the plaintiff, he said it was irmpossible ford4im
to say whether they were issued on the sale of stock for cash,
or whether they were-issued on 'the surrender of. other certificates---:tha.t it would be a mere presumption for him. to state.
The judge was then requested to hold and to instruct the jury
that there was not'sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that
the stock'in question was not genuine-which he declined to do.
This decision was also correct.; It was very doubtful whether the
case was materially changed from what it was when the plaintiff
rested.
Did the evidence given by the Idefendants clearly-and indisputably establish the fact that 'the plaintiff's certificates were
genuine, or were issued on a surre.nder, or transfer of genuine
stock ? Certainly not, and if not, then the question still remained
for the jury, and it would have been error to have :instructed them
as requested.
Even if the case had been changed by the defendants' evidence,
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unless made entirely certain in their favor, it would still remain
for the jury to say what effect should be given to the evidenceespecially if it was to a considerable degree a matter of opinion
or reasoning-and also to what extent a change had been effected
by the proof. All that the defendants could rightfully claim, as
regards this point, was that the judge should charge, as he did do,
that, to entitle the pjaintiff to recover, he was bound to prove to
the satisfaction of the jury, that the certificates bought by him
did not represent genuine stock, or any part of the stock'of the
company, but constituted part of the over-issue, not authorized by
its charter. There was evidence before the jury bearing strongly
on this question. The entire stock of the company had been
taken, and certificates'therefor issued ; after which, and prior to
the purchase by the plaintiff, the defendants had commenced their
system of false issues.
The plaintiff's certificates cert ainly belonged to the class of
spurious issues, unless genuine ones had been surrendered and new
ones sent out in their place.
The* burden was on them to remove the inference deducible
from these facts; and this -they could have done by .showing
that the plaintiff's certificates were issued on the surrender, or on
the transfer of genuine stock. This might be difficult, but if so,
or even if actually impossible, the defendants should not be heard
to complain, when their own admitted culpability creates thedilemma.
No error occurred in the admission or rejection of evidence;
none was admitted against objection bearing on the question submitted to the jury ; nor was any excluded to. which the. defendants
were entitled. They were allowed to prove that the plaintiff
voted, or authorized some one to vote on his stock, as some evidence bearing on the question of its genuineness. But the offer
to show that the directors of the Parker Vein Coal Company,
with the consent of the plaintiff, transferred the property'of the
company to the American Coal Company, and accepted the stock
of the latter in exchange for the stock of the former, and that the
plaintiff took stock in the latter under this arrangement, was properly rejected. Those facts had no tendency to prove that the
plaintiff's certificates represented the genuine stock of the ori
ginal company. How he disposed of the stock did not prove it
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genuine or otherwise. This was a matter with which the defend
ants had no concern. Their liability was complete, if liable at
all, At the time of the purchase by the plaintiff.
The case, having been properly sent to the jury, and the jury
having found in favor of, the plaintiff, must now be further examined, on the hypothesis that the plaintiff's certificates did not
rerresent the genuine stock of the company, but were spuricus.
In this view the defendants asked the judge to charge.the jury as
matter of law, that, even if spurious, there was no evidence that
the certificates in question were purchased from the defendants,
or from the Parker Vein Coal Company, and that, if not pur.
chased from either, then they were not liable in this action. These
requests, and the refusal of the judge so to hold and charge, present the only remaining question of importance pressed on our.
consideration,
The learned judge instructed the jury on this pdint as follows:
"That there was no evidence that the certificates were purchased:
'fromeither the defendants or the company,,but that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff -to prove that he purchased from either4
that if the dbfendants issued the stock, and the plaintiff purchased
it on the faith that it was genuine, authenticated.,as it was, the
defendants were liable, although the actual purghase was made of
others." It is undoubtedly true that a vendor of property guilty
of a fraud on its sale, or who sells with 'warranty, ialiable only
to his vendee. "
A subsequent purchaser acquires no right of action therefor.
As was well stated by the court below, there is in suoh case-no
privity between the vendor and such subsequent purchaser.' But.
is such this case ?"Let us see clearly what facts must be deemed
established by the verdict bf the jury..
The verdict is general'for plaintiff, and every intendment is in
favor, both of its correctness ,and completeness, to sustain the
recovery. The jury have found that the certificates of stock purchased by the plaintiff were spurious; that the defendants issued
or caused them to b' issued with a fraudulent purpose, and tht
the plaintiff purchased tem in good faith, supposing them to be
genuine ; that is, supposing them truly to represent a part of the
capital stock of the company. That they could -notbe enforned
or employed as stock-in other words, that they. gave the pur.o
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chaser no rights as stockholders, is decided in The N. Y. a4d N.
ff. Railroad Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30. These false certifi.
cates were sent forth by the defendants-were thrown into the market by them, as was said in this case cited, "with a view to wellknown and established commercial usages." They authenticated
them, falsely and fraudulently attested them as genuine. They
bore on their face such false attestation, which was equivalent to
an assertion on their part to all persons who should purchase, or
.to whom they should be offered, that they were genuine. In this
way they invited confidence anq induced trade. These acts were
done with the intent to defraud any and all purchasers, well knowing that every person to whose hahds these false certificates should
come by fair purchase might be injured. Wherefore, having
authenticated and issued these certificates for the purpose of defrauding, the defendants should be held liable to any- oie sustaining damage by purchasing -on the-faith of their genuineness. In
this view the defendants are to be considered as acting directly
upon and influencing the purchaser; and of course liable, as every
tort-feasor is, for the damages occasioned by their wrongful act.
It was held in the N. Y. and' N. H. Railroad case, above cited,
that every bond fide holder of spurious certificates (issued as were
those of tle plaintiff here) had a right of action against the company for negligence, in permitting its officer and agent to .perpetrate! a systematic course of fraud, like that proved in this case.*
It mattered not how many transfers had been made. If the certificates had their origin in the fraudulent or over-issues, they
were void, and the bond fide holder had his claim against thq company for damages occasioned by the fraudulent act of its agent,
and in such case a joint action will lie against principal and
agent: Phelps v. Wait, 80 N. Y. 18; or a separate action against
either: Suydam v. Moore and Losee, 8 Barb. 358. The wrongful act is thb servant's in fact, and the principal's by construction.
So the rule which held the company liable in the N. Y, and N.
H. Railroad case to bond fide holders of the spurious certificates
would certainly have held Schuyler, the agent who perpetrated
the fraud, also liable. It was also decided in this case, that to
entitle a party holding spurious certificates to sue, no privity was
necessary, except such as was created by the unlawful act, and
the consequential injury. (See also Gerhard v. Bates, 20 Eng.
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L. & Eq.129). In Thomas v. Winclester, 6 N. Y. 897, the
action was for negligence, charging the. defendant with carelessness in labelling a deadly poison as a harmless medicine, and
sending it so labelled into market. The poison was sold by the
defendant to Aspinwal, and by Aspinwal to Foord, and by the
latter to Thomas, the plaintiff, who administered it to his wife.
The objection was taken that the action could not be sustained, as
the defendant was a remote vendor of'the article; and there
-was no connection, transaction, or privity between him and the
plaintiff, or'either of them. Theobjection was not sustained, and
it was held that the defendant was liable for improperly and negligently labelling the poison as a harmless medicine and sending it
forth into market so labelled.
The defendant would have been none the less liable, if the illegal act had .been. intentional and wilful, instead .of negligent
merely... It necessarily follows, from the do6trine established by
the above cases, that the defendants, having 'issued the false certificates of stock, authenticated by them as genuine, and cast them
upon the market with fraudulent intent, are liable, to every holder
to whose hands they may come by fair purchase. The learned
judge was right, therefore, in refusing t6 chargo as -requested.
We are referred to the case of Seizer v. Mali,82 Barb. 76, as an
authority against the theory adopted by the judge at the Circuit.
It will be seen, however, from the views above expressed, that the
principles recognised in Seizer v. Mai" ire not. here at all impugned. But we are of the opinion that they were not there well
applied.; The same question was discussed in Cazeawu v. Mali,
25 Barb. 578, by Mr. Justice MITcHELL, whose views and conclu.
sions are -approved.
All concurred in the above opinion except HuNT, J., who dissented, and PARkEa, J., who gave no opinion.
Judgment affirmed.

